Before the Cult of Equity: The British Stock Market, 1829-1929
European Review of Economic History, 2021

Campbell, Gareth; Grossman, Richard S.; Turner, John D. We analyze the development and performance of the British equity market during the era when it reigned supreme as the largest in the world. Using an extensive monthly dataset of thousands of companies, we identify the major peaks and troughs in the market and find a relationship with the timing of economic cycles. We also show that the equity risk premium was modest and, contrary to previous research, domestic and foreign stocks earned similar returns for much of the period. We also document the early dominance of the transport and finance sectors and the subsequent emergence of many new industries.

Independent Women: Investing in British Railways, 1870-1922
Economic History Review, 2021

Acheson, Graeme G.; Campbell, Gareth; Gallagher, Aine; Turner, John D. The early twentieth century saw the British capital market reach a state of maturity before any of its global counterparts. This coincided with more women participating directly in the stock market. This study analyses whether these female shareholders chose to invest independently of men. Using a novel dataset of almost 500,000 shareholders in some of the largest British railways, it shows that women were much more likely to be solo shareholders than men. There is also evidence that they prioritized their independence above other considerations such as where they invested or how diversified they could be.

From Complementary to Competitive: The London and U.K. Provincial Stock Markets
Journal of Economic History, 2020

Rogers, Meeghan; Campbell, Gareth; Turner, John For many decades, there were stock exchanges operating in provincial cities across Britain. We analyze why companies listed on these markets and how this changed over time. We find that the provincial exchanges had traditionally been complementary to London, providing a trading venue for smaller regional companies. However, they gradually lost their uniqueness and were increasingly competing with London by listing similar stocks. Much of this change can be explained by shifts in industrial composition, leading to more companies being headquartered and listed in the capital and many of the remaining regional firms cross-listing in London to achieve certification.

The Liquidity of the London Capital Markets, 1825-70
Economic History Review, 2018

Campbell, Gareth; Turner, John D.; Ye, Qing This article examines the liquidity of the London capital markets in the decades following the liberalization of UK incorporation law. Using comprehensive stock and bond data, we calculate a measure of market liquidity for the period 1825-70. We find that stock market liquidity trended upwards but bond market liquidity did not increase over the sample period. Stock market liquidity during our sample period was partially influenced by the bond market, rather than fluctuations in economic output. In our analysis of the cross-sectional determinants of individual stock liquidity, we find that firm size and the number of issued shares were important determinants of liquidity. Finally, we find little evidence of an illiquidity premium, which is consistent with the view that investors did not price liquidity in this nascent market.

What Moved Share Prices in the Nineteenth-Century London Stock Market?
Economic History Review, 2018

Campbell, Gareth; Quinn, William; Turner, John D.; Ye, Qing Using a new weekly blue-chip index, this article investigates the causes of stock price movements on the London market between 1823 and 1870. We find that economic fundamentals explain about 15 per cent of weekly and 34 per cent of monthly variation in share prices. Contemporary press reporting from the London Stock Exchange is used to ascertain what market participants thought was causing the largest movements on the market. The vast majority of large movements were attributed by the press to geopolitical, monetary, railway-sector, and financial-crisis news. Investigating the stock price changes on an independent list of events reaffirms these findings, suggesting that the most important specific events that moved markets were wars involving European powers.

Integration between the London and New York Stock Exchanges, 1825-1925
Economic History Review, 2017

Campbell, Gareth; Rogers, Meeghan In this article the integration between the London and New York Stock Exchanges is analysed during the era when they were still developing as asset markets. The domestic securities on both exchanges showed little sustained integration, even when controlling for the different characteristics of stocks, which implies that the pricing of securities in the US and UK was still being driven by local factors. These results place a limit on the view that the pre-First World War period was the first era of globalization in terms of capital markets. However, there was considerable integration between New York and those listings on London that operated internationally. This suggests that the listing of foreign securities may be one of the primary mechanisms driving asset market integration.

This Time Is Different: Causes and Consequences of British Banking Instability over the Long Run
Journal of Financial Stability, 2016

Campbell, Gareth; Coyle, Christopher; Turner, John D. This paper addresses three questions: (1) How severe were the episodes of banking instability experienced by the UK over the past two centuries? (2) What have been the macroeconomic indicators of UK banking instability? and (3) What have been the consequences of UK banking instability for the cost of credit? Using a unique dataset of bank share prices from 1830 to 2010 to assess the stability of the UK banking system, we find that banking instability has grown more severe since the 1970s. We also find that interest rates, inflation, lending growth, and equity prices are consistent macroeconomic indicators of UK banking instability over the long run. Furthermore, utilising a unique dataset of corporate-bond yields for the period 1860 to 2010, we find that there is a significant long-run relationship between banking instability and the credit-risk premium faced by businesses.

Deriving the Railway Mania
Financial History Review, 2013

Campbell, Gareth This article argues that the promotion boom which occurred in the railway industry during the mid 1840s was amplified by the issue of derivative-like assets, which let investors take highly leveraged positions in the shares of new railway companies. The partially paid shares which the new railway companies issued allowed investors to obtain exposure to an asset by paying only a small initial deposit. The consequence of this arrangement was that investor returns were substantially amplified, and many schemes could be financed simultaneously. However, when investors were required to make further payments it put a negative downward pressure on prices.

The Role of the Media in a Bubble
Explorations in Economic History, 2012

Campbell, Gareth; Turner, John D.; Walker, Clive B. We examine the role of the news media during the British Railway Mania, arguably one of the largest financial bubbles in history. Our analysis suggests that the press responded to changes in the stock market, and its reporting of recent events may have influenced asset prices. However, we find no evidence that the sentiment of the media, or the attention which it gave to particular stocks, had any influence on exacerbating or ending the Mania. The main contribution of the media was to provide factual information which investors could use to inform their decisions.

Myopic Rationality in a Mania
Explorations in Economic History, 2012

Campbell, Gareth The rationality of investors during asset price bubbles has been the subject of considerable debate. An analysis of the British Railway Mania, which occurred in the 1840s, suggests that investors may have been myopic, as their expectations were only accurate in the short-term, but they remained rational, as they acted in a utility maximising manner given their expectations. Investors successfully incorporated forecasts of short-term dividend changes into their valuations, but were unable to predict longer-term changes. When short-term growth is controlled for, it appears that the railways were priced consistently with the non-railways throughout the entire episode.